C
onsider a principal who delegates decision-making authority to a more informed agent. For instance, an executive places an administrator in charge of certain political decisions. The administrator has private information about the appropriate policies for each decision. But her own ideal policy choices may differ from those of the executive. The executive anticipates the administrator's biases, and exerts control by requiring the administrator to choose policies from a restricted set.
This so-called delegation problem was introduced by Holmström (1977 Holmström ( , 1984 . It has been used to analyze issues such as the investment levels a manager may choose, the prices that a regulated monopolist may charge, or the set of tariff levels allowed by a trade agreement. When there is a single decision to be made, Melumad and Shibano (1991) , Martimort and Semenov (2006) , Goltsman et al. (2009) , Alonso and Matouschek (2008) , Ambrus and Egorov (2009) , Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) , and Amador and Bagwell (2013) give a variety of conditions under which it is optimal for the principal to cap the agent's choices against the direction of her bias.
1 When the administrator is more liberal than the executive, the administrator is allowed to choose any policy that is sufficiently conservative. Likewise, a manager who is biased toward investing too much money is given a spending cap; a monopolist is given a price ceiling; a trade agreement sets a maximum tariff level. The more biased is the agent, the tighter is the cap.
The above analysis considers the delegation of a single decision. But the political administrator may make decisions on multiple policies, a manager may invest in more than one project, a country may place tariffs on multiple goods, the monopolist may be pricing a number of separate products. How should we extend the logic of the one-dimensional caps to delegation problems over multiple decisions? Can we do better than independently capping each decision?
Previous work in mechanism design and strategic communication develops a robust intuition that a principal can often improve payoffs by linking together an agent's incentive constraints over multiple decisions, even when the decisions themselves are independent. See, for example, Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) , Jackson and Sonnenschein (2007) , or Frankel (2014) . An executive delegating three decisions might require the administrator to make one liberal decision, one centrist one, and one conservative one. The administrator now faces trade-offs across decisions: even if she always prefers liberal actions, she can only take such an action once. So she takes the liberal action for the decision at which a liberal action is most appropriate. Well-designed quotas can often give the principal high (approximately first-best) payoffs when there are many independent decisions.
2
The logic for the incentive compatibility of such quotas assumes that the agent has identical biases across decisions. That is, the political administrator must have an identical liberal bias for each of three policies she is choosing. If the administrator is very liberal on health care but is centrist or conservative on defense and education, then offered a quota over these three policies she will always just take the liberal action on health care. Likewise, a monopolist may prefer much higher prices on goods with less elastic demand, regardless of her marginal costs. The literature gives little guidance on how to account for an agent with different preferences across decisions.
In this paper, I argue for extending the geometric intuition of capping an agent's choices against the direction of her bias to the multiple decision environment, where her bias is now multidimensional. This rule can properly align an agent's incentives even when she has different biases on each decision. Moreover, the shape of these caps translates into a guideline on how to let the agent make tradeoffs across decisions.
Caps against the bias are most simply illustrated in a setting where the agent has a constant bias relative to the principal: given any principal ideal actions a = ( a 1 , … , a N ) on decisions 1 through N , the agent's ideal point is a + λ = ( a 1 + λ 1 , … , a N + λ N ) for a fixed bias vector λ. Assuming quadratic loss utility functions, a cap against the agent's bias corresponds to a half-space delegation set where the boundary is normal to the agent's bias vector. See Figure 1 .
Mathematically, the feasible action vectors given this cap are those which satisfy ∑ i λ i a i ≤ K for some K . We cap a weighted sum or average of actions, where the weight is proportional to the agent's bias on that decision. In economic terms, these weights can be interpreted as prices. If the administrator is strongly liberal on health care, she must expend a lot of her budget to make health care policy more liberal.
If the administrator is slightly conservative on national defense, she gains a small amount of flexibility on other decisions when she makes defense policy more liberal. Section IIA establishes a benchmark optimality result for this quadratic loss constant bias setting. Caps against the agent's bias are exactly optimal if the principal's ideal points, i.e., the states of the world, follow independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) normal distributions. Section IIB establishes that this form of delegation rule gives high payoffs under much more general distributions of states. In particular, they deliver approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions. Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994, section 3.3 .2) have previously argued that if a multiproduct monopolist has unknown costs, capping a weighted average of prices is likely to improve outcomes relative to predetermined prices or independent caps across products. 3 The above results show that, in some sense, caps on the average are exactly the right solution for problems with quadratic loss constant bias utilities. But utilities will tend to take other functional forms when preferences are derived from a monopolist's profit maximization problem. Section III considers caps against an agent's bias for a broader set of utility functions, including those derived from a monopolist's problem.
In the more general formulation, let the principal's payoff from action a i on decision i be an arbitrary function of the underlying state of the world. Let the agent share the principal's payoffs, plus an additional payoff term G i ( a i ) that depends only on the action taken. Relative to the principal, the agent is biased toward actions with higher values of G i . A cap against the agent's bias corresponds to a restriction of the form ∑ i G i ( a i ) ≤ K . For these more general utility functions, caps against the agent's bias extend the robustness result of the constant bias setting: payoffs are 3 Armstrong and Vickers (2000) solve for optimal regulation mechanisms under the assumption that goods have a binary distribution of underlying costs. approximately first-best when there are many independent decisions. In this sense, caps provide the right incentives for agents to make tradeoffs across decisions.
For the monopoly regulation application, the firm setting prices does not internalize the effect of its price increases on consumer surplus. So a cap against the bias translates into a requirement that the firm chooses prices subject to a minimum level of consumer surplus across all markets. Similarly, a trade agreement would specify that an importing country can set tariffs subject to a floor on foreign profits summed up across goods. We can also use these preferences to analyze a political delegation problem in which the agent may be "moderate" or "extreme" in addition to conservative or liberal.
Section IV then considers some straightforward extensions of the model. I show that caps against the bias continue to align incentives when decisions are taken sequentially rather than all at once, and are approximately optimal for a fixed number of potentially correlated decisions when the agent is strongly biased.
The vast majority of the literature solving for optimal delegation sets focuses on single-decision problems in which the agent's bias is known (see the papers above). 4 Frankel (2014) considers multiple-decision problems in which the agent's bias is unknown. In that paper, decisions can be linked because the agent's unknown bias is taken to be identical across decisions. The current paper bridges a gap, looking at multiple-decision problems in which the agent's bias is known. This lets me explore how to provide incentives and create tradeoffs for agents whose preferences differ across decisions. Koessler and Martimort (2012) consider an alternative extension of a delegation model to multiple decisions, or equivalently to one multidimensional decision. The agent has known biases which may differ across two dimensions of actions, but in contrast to the current paper there is a one-dimensional underlying state. This can be thought of as modeling a joint restriction on the price and quality of a single product, rather than a restriction on the prices of two distinct products. Alonso, Brocas, and Carrillo (2014) study a model where multiple decisions are delegated to different agents, under an exogenous budget constraint across decisions.
Multiple decisions have also been studied in contexts where the principal elicits "cheap talk" information from the agent but cannot commit to a decision rule. The ability to commit can only improve the principal's payoffs; anything that can be achieved in a cheap talk environment can also be achieved under delegation. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2007) show how the principal can get high payoffs without commitment when states are i.i.d. and biases are identical across decisions. Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) show how to incentivize the agent to make appropriate tradeoffs across decisions when her biases across decisions differ in a general way, but her preferences are state-independent. Battaglini (2002) looks at a cheap talk environment with both multiple decisions and multiple informed agents (senders). He shows that there may be robust equilibria in which senders with different biases are induced to fully reveal the state.
Finally, the corporate finance literature has argued that forms of credit linesbudgets implemented over time-can be components of optimal contracts to constrain agents who want to invest too much of the principal's money; see, for instance, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) , DeMarzo and Fishman (2007) , and Malenko (2011) . In Malenko (2011) , the agent has state-independent preferences and her payoff is linear in the amount of money spent. The author points out that if the agent is known to prefer certain types of projects over others, then the budget should correct for this (as in the current paper) by putting a higher "price" on the preferred investments.
I. The Model
A principal and agent jointly make N < ∞ decisions, indexed by i = 1, … , N . Each decision has an exogenous underlying state θ i ∈ 핉 , and an action a i ∈ 핉 is to be taken. Principal and agent payoffs on decision i depend on the action and the state, and are given by u Pi ( a i | θ i ) and u Ai ( a i | θ i ) . For each state θ i , let a i * ( θ i ) denote some principal-optimal action in arg max a i u Pi ( a i | θ i ) . Total payoffs V P and V A are additively separable across decisions:
At the start of the game, the principal knows the number of decisions, N ; the utility functions u Pi and u Ai ; and he has some prior belief about the joint distribution of the states. Only the agent will observe the state realizations. To try to make use of the agent's information, the principal "delegates" the decisions: he lets the agent choose actions, subject to certain constraints on the actions, that she is allowed to take. The game is as follows:
(ii) The agent observes the vector of underlying states θ = ( θ 1 , … , θ N ).
(iii) The agent chooses a vector of actions a = ( a 1 , … , a N ) from the set  to maximize V A .
Because the principal knows the agent's utility functions u Ai , he can predict which actions the agent will take under any delegation set  and any state realizations θ.
5 So he can calculate his expected payoff from any proposed delegation set , taking expectation over θ with respect to his prior. Denote this payoff as
. 5 We can assume that the agent will break ties in favor of the principal's preferences if she has multiple optimal actions, but the tie-breaking rule is not relevant for any results.
In this paper, I will show two main classes of results: optimal delegation sets for a fixed delegation problem, and delegation sets which guarantee approximately firstbest payoffs in a sequence of problems.
A delegation set is optimal for a delegation problem if it maximizes the principal's expected payoff V ̃ P () over all delegation sets .
Given some sequence of delegation problems, a sequence of corresponding delegation sets gives the principal approximately first-best payoffs if the expected payoff per decision goes to the first-best level. To be formal, let us define an independent sequence of delegation problems as follows. Fix an infinite sequence of principal
and an infinite sequence of distributions
∞ over 핉. The Nth delegation problem in this independent sequence has N decisions, with payoff functions u Pi and u Ai on decision i ≤ N , and state θ i distributed independently according to F i . Given a corresponding sequence of delegation sets (  (N ) ) N=1 ∞ in 핉 N , the expected payoff to the principal on the Nth delegation problem is
) . We achieve approximately first-best payoffs if
We can also be precise about the rate at which payoffs per decision go to first-best as the number of decisions grows. Fix some nonnegative function q (N) which goes to 0 in N . Say that the payoffs per decision go to first-best at a rate of q (N ) if there exist constants 0 < η _ < _ η such that for all N large enough, the principal's payoff loss relative to first-best
) . The payoffs per decision go to first-best at a rate at least as fast as q (N) if we have the limiting upper bound on payoff loss _ η q (N) , but not necessarily a lower bound η _ q(N).
II. Quadratic Loss, Constant Bias Utilities
The players have quadratic loss, constant bias utilities if
So the principal wants to choose action a i to match the state θ i , while the agent prefers a i = θ i + λ i . The players have quadratic losses from taking actions away from their respective ideal points of θ and θ + λ. I call λ = ( λ 1 , … , λ N ) the bias of the agent, and its Euclidean norm | λ | represents the magnitude of the bias. If the principal's ideal action were taken at each decision, he would receive a first-best payoff normalized to zero. This is a natural model of the delegation of a number of political decisions, from an executive to an administrator or from a legislative body to a committee. A lower action a i represents a more liberal policy on decision i , and a higher action represents a more conservative policy. The executive (principal) does not know what policies are best; the administrator (agent) is better informed about the executive's preferred policy θ i on decision i . But the players' policy preferences disagree. The administrator may be much more liberal than the executive on health care ( λ strongly negative), say, and slightly more conservative on issues of national defense ( λ mildly positive).
These utilities can also model a school delegating grading decisions to a teacher who is a grade-inflator or grade-deflator. Student i 's performance is given by θ i , which is privately observed by the teacher, and the student will be assigned a grade a i . Here we would presumably think of the teacher having a uniform bias across all students, in which case λ i would be identical across all i . Likewise, we can model an empire-building manager choosing investments for a firm. The underlying productivity of the project determines the amount θ i that the firm would want to invest, but the manager wants to invest θ i + λ i > θ i . Again, the manager's bias λ i would be identical across decisions if her preference toward overinvestment didn't depend on the identity of the project. I begin with the analysis of N = 1 , the delegation of a single decision. For an unbiased agent with λ = 0 , complete freedom would be optimal-that is,  = 핉 . The agent would then choose the principal's first-best action.
To find the optimal single-decision delegation set when the agent is biased, we can apply prior work such as Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) . The principal should cap the agent against her bias: use an action ceiling if the bias is positive, or a floor if the bias is negative. More precisely, if the agent has positive bias λ > 0 , 6 it follows from the increasing hazard rate of the normal distribution that the optimal delegation set would be  = {a | a ≤ _ k (λ)} , where the action ceiling
Interpreting this delegation set, the agent chooses her ideal action of a = θ + λ for low states ( θ ≤ _ k − λ) , and chooses the action ceiling _ k for higher states. The ceiling is set so that conditional on the agent's choosing an action at this cap, the average state (expected principal ideal point) is equal to the ceiling. Details are given in the Proof of Lemma 1.
Symmetrically, with a negative bias λ < 0 , the optimal delegation set is a floor rather than a ceiling:  = {a | a ≥ − _ k (−λ)} . We can sum up the optimal delegation set for all nonzero biases as
Following Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) , these delegation sets are optimal even in an extended environment in which the agent may be given stochastic delegation sets, i.e., delegation sets containing lotteries over actions. See that paper for details of the stochastic mechanism design problem.
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LEMMA 1 (Application of Kováč and Mylovanov 2009) : Let N = 1 , and let θ ∼ (0, 1) :
(2)  * remains optimal in the extended class of stochastic delegation mechanisms.
Proposition 1 builds on this prior work to give a benchmark optimality result for the delegation of multiple decisions. Under i.i.d. normal states, the optimal multidimensional delegation set is a half-space with boundary normal to the agent's bias vector; see Figure 2 . This new result generalizes the concept of a "cap against the bias" to arbitrarily many decisions, and arbitrary biases on each decision. 
is an optimal delegation set.
The formal proof of the proposition is given in Appendix A; I sketch the proof below. All other proofs, including that of Lemma 1, are in Appendix B.
SKETCH OF PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1:
First consider an augmented game in which the principal can "cheat" and observe extra information: before choosing the delegation set, he gets to learn on which line parallel to the vector λ is the realized state. In other words, he learns the line containing both his and the agent's ideal points in the N -dimensional space of actions. Whatever payoffs he can achieve in the augmented game are an upper bound on his true payoffs.
In this augmented game, the principal faces a one-dimensional problem embedded in N dimensions: he knows that the state is distributed normally on a line, and the agent's bias is parallel to this line. If this were literally a one-dimensional problem he would use the one-dimensional optimum described above to find the optimal augmented delegation set. He would cap the agent against her bias by picking the optimal half-bounded interval contained in this line, as given by Lemma 1, part 1.
I next show that this half-bounded interval cannot be improved upon by a delegation set that induces the agent to sometimes take an action vector off of the line. This result will follow from Lemma 1, part 2. In particular, the payoffs to the principal and agent from taking an action off of the line are mathematically equivalent to those from taking a randomized action on the line. An action off of the line gives both the principal and agent the payoff of playing the action's projection onto the line, minus a quadratic loss term. A randomized action vector gives the two players the payoff of playing the mean action, minus a variance term. So the result of no randomization in Lemma 1, part 2 yields the desired conclusion, that a half-bounded interval contained in the line is the augmented optimal delegation set. Call this the augmented ray.
Finally, I show that the delegation set  * (in the non-augmented game) implements the same actions as do the optimal augmented rays. In fact,  * is constructed as the union of all possible augmented rays. So the agent chooses her ideal point from  * exactly when it would have been available on the augmented ray. For state realizations where the ideal point is unachievable, the agent chooses the closest action in  * to her ideal point. Because the boundary of  * is normal to the bias, the vector pointing from this closest action to the ideal point is in the direction of the bias; hence, the selection from  * is exactly just the cap of the appropriate 
augmented ray. So in either case, the agent chooses identically from  * as from the augmented ray;  * achieves an upper bound on payoffs in the original game, and is optimal. 8 This final step was where the assumption of i.i.d. normality became crucially important. The key property is that conditional distributions along parallel lines are simply translations of one another. Therefore the augmented rays for different state realizations are all just translations perpendicular to the bias vector. This is why the union of the augmented rays yielded a halfspace with boundary normal to the bias. ∎ There is a simple geometric interpretation of these half-space delegation sets. We can think of the space of actions in 핉 N as generated by an orthogonal basis consisting of λ along with N − 1 perpendicular vectors. Under the new basis, the agent has a bias of 0 in each of the N − 1 perpendicular dimensions; her preferences coincide with the principal's. So the agent is given complete freedom along these dimensions of common interest. But on the dimension of disagreement parallel to λ, the principal caps the agent's choices to prevent her from taking actions that are too extreme in the direction of the bias.
In the delegation set  * , we can think of the cap on action j as depending endogenously on all of the other actions taken:
might cap each decision separately rather than linking constraints in this manner. However, the joint constraint improves on naive caps by further aligning the agent's incentives. Consider a problem where the bias λ j is positive; the agent prefers action a j to be higher than what the principal wants. A hard cap on a j is a coarse way of getting the agent to take lower actions. The principal would like a finer tool. With transfer payments, for instance, the principal could give increasing payments to the agent for lower actions. We do not have transfer payments in this problem, but the existence other decisions can simulate transfers. Under the optimal delegation set ∑ i λ i a i ≤ _ K , the principal rewards the agent for low a j by giving her additional freedom on other decisions. The principal punishes her for high a j by further constraining her on other decisions. See Figure 3 .
We now have an economic interpretation of the cap to go along with the geometric one. The principal gives the agent _ K units of artificial resources ("delegation dollars"), and tells the agent to spend up to this amount on buying a bundle of actions. The price of each unit of action a i is set to be equal to the agent's bias along that dimension, λ i . So if the administrator has a strong liberal bias on health care, then she gets a lot of credit-in the form of flexibility on other decisions-for making health care policy a little more conservative. To make health care decisions more liberal, she must likewise give up a lot of flexibility on other decisions. If the administrator has a small conservative bias on national defense, then she gets a little bit of credit for making defense more liberal. And if she shares the executive's preferences on education, then she is free to choose any education policy without affecting the constraints on her other decisions.
If biases are the same on all decisions-as they may be for an empire-building investment manager, or a grade-inflating teacher-then the policy simply caps the unweighted sum or average of decisions. So the manager is given a budget of dollars to spend across all investments, and the teacher is given a GPA ceiling for her class. Indeed, a GPA ceiling of exactly this form is used at places such as the business school of the University of Chicago.
Comparative statics and Payoffs.-For nonzero biases, the proposition states that the optimal delegation set is a half-space. The half-space always contains the origin, the uninformed principal's ex ante preferred action. The bounding hyperplane of this half-space, ∑ i λ i a i = _ K , is normal to the bias vector λ and is a distance of
The further is the boundary from the origin, the larger is the set of actions that the agent is allowed to take. We can derive the following comparative statics on the distance _ k of the cap to the origin. Notes: Here  ind is the best delegation set with independent constraints on a 1 and a 2 .  * gives the agent more freedom on a 2 if she moves a 1 against the direction of her bias. This linking of constraints improves payoffs. To give context to these payoff values, the principal's first-best outcome (from taking a = θ) gives V P = 0 while taking action 0 (an uninformed principal's ex ante choice) gives So the stronger is the agent's bias, the less freedom she is given. An unbiased agent is given complete freedom, and an agent with a very strong bias is only allowed to take actions on a half-space which just barely contains the origin. Even in the limit of infinitely large biases, though, the agent retains a considerable amount of flexibility when there is more than one decision to be made. She would not simply pick the principal's ex ante preferred action of a = 0. She might pick any action on the bounding hyperplane defined by ∑ i λ i a i = 0 , a set of dimension N − 1 . So we see that with multiple decisions, delegation provides a benefit even when the agent has a strong bias.
One can also consider how the agent's freedom depends on the variance of the state realizations. (For notational ease, I had normalized the variance of each distribution to 1, but we could have taken any variance σ 2 .) In fact, this comparative statics result follows from the previous proposition under a straightforward change of variables. When the variance of each state increases, the principal pushes the cap outward from the origin, allowing the agent to choose from a larger set of actions.
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Let us now look at the principal's payoff from these optimal delegation sets. First suppose N = 1 , so that there is only a single decision. If the agent were unbiased, the principal would give her complete freedom and would get a first-best payoff of zero. As the agent's bias grew the cap would move in to the origin, and the payoff would fall, but it would be bounded below. For an infinitely large bias the agent would simply take every action at the ceiling of a = 0 , giving the principal a payoff of −1 -minus the variance of the state.
With multiple decisions, the principal's payoff is exactly as if the agent were given an optimal cap on a single decision with bias of | λ |. This comes from the spherical symmetry of the normal distribution; payoffs and distributions are unchanged if we rotate the problem so that the bias is along a single dimension i . So the principal would get the payoff of an optimal one-decision cap on the one biased decision, and the first-best payoff of 0 on N − 1 unbiased decisions. As we add decisions with arbitrary biases, then the principal's total expected payoff approaches a constant value of at worst −1 , the minimum payoff on a single decision. His average payoff per decision goes to the first-best level of 0 at a rate of 1/N .
PROPOSITION 3: Fix an independent sequence of delegation problems in which the players have quadratic loss, constant bias utilities; the agent's sequence of biases
∞ is not identically equal to 0; and states are drawn from the standard normal distribution. Then the corresponding sequence of optimal delegation sets  * gives approximately first-best payoffs, with payoffs per decision going to first-best at a rate of 1/N .
Note that if the principal used a naïve delegation rule with independent caps for each decision (delegation sets  ind in Figure 3 ), payoffs per decision would not 9 For a variance of σ 2 on each state, we can divide states, actions, and biases through by σ to get an equivalent problem with unit variance. Transforming back to the original variables, the cap should be a distance of σ _ k (|λ|/σ) from the origin. The expression _ k (|λ|/σ) increases in σ (Proposition 2, part 1), so the product σ _ k (|λ|/σ) does as well. approach the first-best level of zero as we added decisions. With an identical nonzero bias on each decision, for instance, the payoff per decision would be negative and constant in N . The absolute payoff would go to minus infinity rather than to −1 .
B. Half-space Caps under General Distributions
The optimality results above required an assumption that states were i.i.d. normal. However, the geometric and economic intuition for half-space delegation sets came from the form of the preferences, not the distributional details. In this section, I argue that these delegation sets are still a good rule of thumb for the principal under much broader distributional assumptions, even though they may no longer be fully optimal. In particular, I will show that these delegation sets achieve approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions.
Let us begin with some notation. Fixing an agent bias λ, let  In the language of Frankel (2014) , part 1 of the lemma states that the hyperspace delegation sets  H (K ) induce aligned delegation: given the constraints of the mechanism, the agent plays exactly as the principal would want her to.
10 Part 2 says that this aligned play under the hyperplane  H (K ) gives a lower bound for the principal's payoff from the half-space  Hs (K ) . Any time a positively biased agent wants to take an action below the cap, the principal must want the lower action even more strongly.
In the analysis below, I will focus on hyperplane and half-space delegation sets defined by one particular budget level. Setting K = ∑ i λ i E [ θ i ] , the hyperplane (or, 10 Frankel (2014) considers an environment where biases are identical across decisions, but the bias itself is unknown. When preferences are of the quadratic loss, constant bias form, the aligned hyperplane delegation set corresponds to fixing the unweighted sum or average of actions at some predetermined level.
The alignment of incentives by hyperplane delegation sets is also related to Chakraborty and Harbaugh (2010) , which shows that N − 1 dimensions of private information (e.g., location on a hyperplane) can be revealed by an agent with state-independent preferences. for half-spaces, the bounding hyperplane) cuts through the mean state. Call these the mean hyperplane  MH and the mean half-space 
MHs
:
While  MHs is not necessarily the principal's favorite half-space delegation set (as seen in the i.i.d. normal case, where K > 0 was optimal), the hyperplane  The formula in Lemma 3 shows that the payoff from the delegation set  MH depends on the variance of a weighted sum of the states. In the case of independent states with bounded variance, the aggregate uncertainty on this weighted sum would wash out, giving us approximately first-best payoffs per decision; Proposition 4 below, regarding payoffs from the half-space  MHs , follows as a corollary. On the other hand, if we were to normalize all biases to be positive, a positive correlation across states would increase the variance of the weighted sum and therefore reduce payoffs from  MH . As we approached perfect correlation, the principal would no longer benefit from linking the decisions with  The proposition implies that the mean half-space guarantees a rate of convergence to first-best of 1/N whenever states are i.i.d. from some distribution with finite variance. As with the i.i.d. normal setting, this convergence rate is suggested by the geometric intuition for half-space delegation sets. Under a change of basis, it is as though we have N − 1 unbiased decisions and a single biased decision. The 11 Koessler and Martimort (2012) shows how the principal may benefit from linking perfectly correlated states through other mechanisms than hyperplanes or half-spaces, when the agent has different biases across the states. In the notation of the current paper, they derive optimal delegation mechanisms for the case of N = 2, where
proposed half-space delegation set gives full freedom on the unbiased decisions, and hence no payoff loss; and then a bounded payoff loss from capping the single biased decision. This corresponds to a payoff loss on the order of 1/N per decision.
From Proposition 3, we know that the rate of 1/N is in fact optimal for one particular i.i.d. distribution-the normal. So the 1/N convergence rate is tight; in the language of Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) , the half-space delegation sets D MHs are worst-case asymptotic optimal.
12 I conjecture that the rate of 1/N is optimal in a much larger family of distributions. Converging at a faster rate would mean that the absolute payoff (as opposed to payoff per decision) would increase to the first-best level of zero as we added decisions.
III. General Bias Utilities
Now consider more general utility functions, where the agent may no longer have a constant bias. The players have general bias utilities if the principal has an arbitrary utility function u Pi ( a i | θ i ) on decision i , and the agent's utilities are of the form
. This functional form implies that the agent's preferences are partially aligned with those of the principal. When choosing actions, she maximizes the principal's payoffs plus an additional bias term G i that depends only on actions. That is, the agent's action payoffs vary with the state in the same way as the principal's do, but she has an additional preference for taking actions with large G i values. The nuisance term H i is convenient to include for applications, but does not affect preferences. I assume that the functions u Pi and G i are continuous:
The agent pushes for action vectors with higher ∑ i G i ( a i ) . A cap against the agent's biases corresponds to a delegation set  (K ) that caps the sum ∑ i G i ( a i ) at a budget level K :
These caps align incentives in the sense of Lemma 2. If only actions with ∑ i G i ( a i ) = K were available, the agent's choice would fully agree with that of the principal; allowing actions with ∑ i G i ( a i ) below K can only help the principal.
This general bias formulation includes the quadratic loss, constant bias utilities as a special case. 12 The double auctions studied by Satterthwaite and Williams (2002) are particularly appealing for their application because they are "belief-free" for the designer, requiring no information about underlying distributions. The delegation sets  MHs that I consider require the principal to input the agent's bias and also the mean of the distribution of states. Frankel: Delegating Multiple Decisions Example 1: Let the players have quadratic loss, constant bias utilities. We can write utilities in the following manner:
.
A cap against the bias is a ceiling on the sum ∑ i G i ( a i ) = ∑ i 2 λ i a i . Modulo the factor of 2, these are exactly the half-space delegation sets 
Hs
(K ) discussed in Section II. As we have seen, half-space caps against the agent's bias are exactly optimal under i.i.d. normal states and give approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions.
We can also now allow decisions to be asymmetrically significant. Let the principal and agent maximize
, and so a cap is of the form ∑ i α i λ i a i ≤ K . The price of increasing an action is now proportional to both the bias and the significance of the decision. ∎ For the general bias utilities, Section IIIA extends the approximate optimality results of Section IIB, while Section IIIB discusses additional applications and examples. In Appendix D, I discuss how caps may be further generalized to preferences that are nonseparable across decisions. In a broad sense, these caps tell us how to put together decisions to incentivize the agent to act in the principal's interests. Under the interpretation of a cap against the bias as a budget from which the agent buys actions, this analysis tells us how to get marginal prices right. Note that I do not have additional optimality results for this setting. By taking into account the details of the state distribution, one might be able to improve upon these caps.
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A. Payoff results
This section establishes that caps against the bias give approximately first-best payoffs when there are many independent decisions. To avoid technical complications, I will make a number of boundedness assumptions on this environment. These assumptions could be relaxed in various ways, but making the assumptions simplifies the analysis and allows me to keep utility functions in a very general form.
ASSUMPTION 1 (Boundedness):
In an independent sequence of decision problems with general biases, define μ i as the expectation of G i ( a i * ( θ i )) and σ i as the standard deviation of G i ( a i * ( θ i )) . The following conditions hold:
(ii) There exist uniform utility bounds u _ < _ u such that for all i and all
(iii) There exist uniform bias bounds G _ < _ G , such that for all i and for all
(iv) There exists σ _ > 0 , such that the number of decisions i ≤ N with In fact, in this general class of utilities and distributions, caps against the bias sometimes converge to first-best at exactly the rate of 1/ √ _ N .
15 So while we know that it is sometimes possible to do much better-e.g., quadratic loss payoffs with constant biases give a 1/N convergence rate-the convergence rate I find is essentially the best possible guaranteed rate.
14 That is, for N large enough, there exists η > 0, such that the number of decisions i ≤ N with σ i < σ _ is less than η √ _ N . This assumption is stronger than necessary, but guarantees that we can trade off actions across sufficiently many decisions.
15 I thank Jason Hartline for the following example. Let θ i ∈ {0, 1} and let u Pi = −| a i − θ i | for a i ∈ [0, 1] . Let the agent have some bias of G i ( a i ) = λ a i for λ > 1 , so that for any decision i she prefers to take the action as high as possible regardless of θ i . A cap against the bias corresponds to a requirement that ∑ i a i ≤ K (dividing out the constant factor λ ). The agent's optimal strategy, ignoring a minor integer constraint, is to treat this as a quota in which exactly K actions are chosen at a i = 1 . The agent will choose a i = 1 for as many θ i = 1 decisions as possible, and if there are any remaining spots will choose a i = 1 for some decisions with θ i = 0 . The principal's payoff loss relative to first-best is the number of misallocated decisions, which is proportional to √ 
B. Applications and special Cases
Monopoly Price regulation.-Suppose, as in models considered in Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994, section 3.3 .2) and Armstrong and Vickers (2000) , that there is a multiproduct monopolist. A regulator seeks to regulate prices in such a way as to maximize total surplus, but the monopolist has private information on her costs for each good. Demand curves for each of the products are commonly known and do not interact.
We can put this into the general bias utility formulation, for arbitrary demand curves. Let the cost curve of product i be parametrized by θ i , privately observed by the monopolist, and let the chosen price be a i . Profits in market i are Π i ( a i | θ i ) , while consumer surplus is C s i ( a i ) -consumer surplus depends on the prices but not the costs. 16 Payoffs for the principal and agent are
The delegation set  (K ) fixing ∑ i G i ( a i ) ≤ K corresponds to a regulation that the monopolist chooses prices subject to a minimum level of consumer surplus:
Indeed, this form of policy is suggested in Armstrong, Cowan, and Vickers (1994, section 3.3.2) as a simple way to do better than a rule fixing the prices at a predetermined level; the additional flexibility can help but cannot hurt. My results show that this cap is an effective way to get high payoffs when there are many decisions. The monopolist will trade off prices across markets in a way that aligns her incentives with those of the consumers. Appendix D discusses how a cap that imposes a floor on consumer surplus continues to align incentives even when goods in different markets interact through cross-elasticities of demand.
Under this cap, we can interpret C s i ′ ( a i ) as the marginal flexibility cost of increasing price a i . The higher is C s i ′ ( a i ) , the more the agent must decrease other prices in order to be allowed to raise the price on good i by an incremental amount. Of course, the derivative of consumer surplus with respect to price is just the quantity. So this marginal flexibility cost is exactly the number of units sold. When the monopolist is up against the price cap, she can raise the price of a good selling 1,000 units by $0.01 only if she lowers the price on a good selling 500 units by $0.02. Moreover, along the demand curve for a given good, quantity falls with higher prices. So the agent gets less credit from reducing a high price than a low one, and uses up less credit when increasing an already high price. As prices go up, the marginal flexibility cost falls more quickly for goods with more elastic demand.
Tariff Policy.-In Amador and Bagwell (2013) , tariff policy is modeled in a delegation framework. An importing country enters into a trade agreement which seeks to maximize ex ante surplus. Once the agreement is entered, the importing country faces a "political shock" that affects how much it values domestic industry profits. Here the agent is an importing government setting tariff levels that imply domestic producer profits of a i on industry i , and tariff revenue plus consumer surplus of b i ( a i ) . (Producer profits are an increasing function of tariff levels, so there is a oneto-one map between profits a i and implied tariff levels.) The agent has payoffs of θ i a i + b i ( a i ) on decision i , where θ i > 0 represents the realization of the political shock. The principal is a social planner who values importing country welfare (including the political benefit of domestic profits) plus foreign profits of v i ( a i ) on industry i . 18 This gives payoffs of
Amador and Bagwell (2013) consider the case of a single good, and develop conditions under which the optimal policy is a cap on domestic profits a , or equivalently a cap on the maximum tariff. I now consider a variety of imported goods. Payoffs are additive across goods because I assume that the goods are in different industries with noninteracting production and demand, and the domestic producers competing with these imports each receive some distinct political shock. In this context, a cap against the bias fixing ∑ i G i ( a i ) ≤ K corresponds to a trade agreement requiring that the importing government chooses tariffs subject to a minimum level of foreign profits:
Rather than have distinct caps on each separate good, I argue for a joint tariff cap across all of the goods. In the event of a particularly strong protectionist shock to one industry, the country has the flexibility to place a very high tariff on that product. To compensate, though, it must lower the tariffs on other goods. The floor on foreign 18 I use θ for their variable γ , and I use a for their variable π . profits tells us exactly how much we must trade off increases on one good's tariffs for decreases on others. Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) consider agents with linear biases in a quadratic loss framework over a single decision. This can model political delegation in which the administrator is extreme or moderate relative to the executive, in addition to being more conservative or liberal. The principal has ideal point normalized to a i = θ i on decision i , as under quadratic loss, constant bias preferences. The agent has ideal point a i = ζ i θ i + λ i for ζ i ∈ 핉 ++ , λ i ∈ 핉 . The ζ i represents the agent's relative sensitivity to state changes. The agent is "extreme" on dimension i if ζ i > 1 , and "moderate" if ζ i < 1 . We can put this into the functional form of general bias utilities in the following way:
Quadratic Loss, Linear Bias utilities.-Papers such as
This embeds the constant bias utility functions for ζ i = 1 . With ζ i < 1 , the agent's bias pushes her ideal point inward from the principal's ideal point toward some "agreement state" θ ̂ i = λ i /(1 − ζ i ) . With ζ i < 1 , the bias points outward from the agreement state.
We know the optimal single-decision delegation sets from Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) , under appropriate assumptions on the state distribution. For a very moderate agent, one who is inwardly biased, we forbid moderate actions and require the agent to take actions from either a low or a high interval. For an extreme agent, we forbid extreme actions and require the agent to take actions from an interval bounded on both ends.
The corresponding caps that I propose are sets  (K) defined by action vectors with
Focusing on decision i while holding all other actions fixed, this corresponds to three possible cases. For ζ i > 1 , the coefficient on a i 2 is positive, so the agent is given both a ceiling and a floor-the extreme-biased agent is forbidden from taking 19 The scaling of the agent's payoffs by the leading coefficient of
would be an irrelevant transformation in a one-decision problem, but with multiple decisions allows for payoffs to be put into the general bias functional form. extreme actions. For ζ i < 1 , the coefficient on a i 2 is negative, so the agent is allowed to take actions either below some low level or above some high level-the moderate agent is forbidden from taking moderate actions. For ζ i = 1, we have our old result that an agent with positive bias λ i > 0 is given a ceiling, an agent with a negative bias λ i < 0 is given a floor, and an agent with no bias λ i = 0 is given full freedom. In other words, the sets generalize the one-dimensional caps found by Melumad and Shibano (1991) and Alonso and Matouschek (2008) .
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In multiple dimensions, this delegation set  (K ) is a region bounded by a quadric, the N -dimensional analog of a conic section. Figure 4 shows the possible shapes of these caps when there are two decisions. If the agent is extreme on both decisions, the delegation set is the interior of an ellipse (panel A). If the agent is moderate on both, the delegation set is the exterior of an ellipse (panel B). When the agent is mixed, being moderate on one and extreme on the other, the delegation set is a region bounded by a hyperbola (panels C and D). With more decisions, an agent who was moderate on all decisions would take actions in the exterior of an N -dimensional ellipsoid, and one who was always extreme would take actions on the interior of such an ellipsoid.
IV. Extensions
In this section I consider some other ways in which caps against the agent's bias may work well as delegation sets. I first consider an extension in which I change the timing of the model, so that decisions are taken sequentially rather than simultaneously. In that case the results from Sections IIB and IIIA regarding high payoffs under many decisions continue to hold for caps against the bias. I then discuss a form of payoff alignment for these delegation sets that holds for a fixed number of decisions, rather than as the number of decisions grows large. Fixing any joint distribution of states, caps against the bias become approximately optimal as the agent's bias grows stronger.
A. sequential Decisions
Suppose decisions are taken sequentially rather than all at once. At period i the agent observes the state θ i and chooses action a i from a delegation set , then she observes the next state θ i+1 and takes action a i+1 ∈  i+1 , and so forth. The principal can condition the one-dimensional delegation set  i at period i ≤ N on all previous actions, a 1 through a i−1 .
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These conditional delegation sets at each period are equivalent to a single multidimensional delegation set  ⊆ 핉 N from which the agent can choose a vector of 20 Under the distributional assumptions of these two papers, the forbidding of moderate actions is shown to be optimal in one-decision examples with ζ < 1/2 . The delegation sets I propose involve forbidding moderate actions under broader circumstances, i.e., ζ < 1 . 21 In the simultaneous setting, delegation sets were without loss of generality as contracting mechanisms, supposing that the principal only had the power to restrict the agent's choices. This holds in a sequential setting as long as the principal can observe past actions but gets no signals of past states. The principal might do better if he could condition the delegation set  i+1 on signals such as past utility realizations; he could limit the agent's freedom on decision i + 1 if his utility realization on decision i was low, for instance.
actions, just as in the simultaneous problem. But in the sequential problem the agent is less informed at the time of each decision: she knows the realizations of past but not future states. In this environment, I show that caps against the bias-defined as exactly as before as multidimensional delegation sets  ⊆ 핉 
The principal's payoff from the mean half-space 
bounded away from 0. However, the payoff per decision will tend to go to 0 under less pathological sequences of biases. 
B. strong Biases
Consider once again the quadratic loss, constant bias utilities. Under i.i.d. normal states, Propositions 1 and 2 tell us that the optimal delegation set approaches the mean half-space  MHs when the magnitude of the bias grows large. In fact, for arbitrary state distributions, the mean half-space becomes approximately optimal with large biases; no other delegation sets can do much better. This is because a strongly biased agent tries to choose an action vector as far as possible in the direction of her bias. Conditional on being any given distance in the direction of the bias, though, the agent's preferences are completely aligned with the principal's. So in the limit with very strong biases, the principal can do no better than capping how far the agent may push the action vector in the direction of the bias, and giving complete freedom otherwise; in other words, a half-space normal to the bias. The best such half-space is the mean half-space. I present one formalization of this approximate optimality result in Appendix C.
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For general bias utilities, likewise, we could fix some principal payoffs and some joint distribution of N states while scaling up each of the G i bias functions. As these bias functions grew large, the agent would approximately try to maximize ∑ i G i ( a i ) .
And caps on this sum give the agent maximal freedom on this dimension of alignment. So, again, caps against the bias would become approximately optimal under appropriate regularity conditions.
V. Conclusion
Developing general methods to solve for optimal multiple-decision delegation sets-under general joint distributions of states, general payoffs (perhaps nonseparable across decisions), and when decisions may be sequential instead of simultaneous-is an open topic for future research. This paper provides some basic intuition on what we might expect the optimal sets may look like: caps against a multidimensional bias, with suitable adjustments to follow the distribution of underlying states.
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These caps have a simple and intuitive economic interpretation. Rather than treating the decisions independently, the principal gives the agent a single budget out of which she "purchases" all of her actions. To induce the agent to make the proper trade-offs across decisions, the "price" of increasing actions depends on the agent's biases. For the constant bias setting, for instance, the price is proportional to an agent's bias on that decision. In some sense, the existence of multiple decisions acts as a surrogate form of transfer payments: we reward and punish the agent not with money, but by giving her more or less flexibility on other decisions. 22 The logic follows that in Frankel (2014) , which shows that if an agent has identical biases on each decision, but the bias magnitude is unknown and may be extreme, then hyperplane delegation sets of the form ∑ i a i = K are max-min optimal. In relation to that result, the innovation of the current paper is to use a hyperplane ∑ i λ i a i = K to correct for different biases on different decisions, and to observe that half-spaces are at least as good as hyperplanes (Lemma 2, part 2). 23 In a discussion of the difficulties in solving for optimal multidimensional delegation sets, Armstrong (1995) writes: "In order to gain tractable results it may be that ad hoc families of sets such as rectangles or circles would need to be considered... Moreover, in a multi-dimensional setting it will often be precisely the shape of the choice set that is of interest. For instance, consider the problem of finding the optimal form of price cap regulation for a multiproduct firm... In this case, what is of interest is the shape of the allowed set of prices (e.g., to what extent does it resemble such commonly used mechanisms as 'average revenue' price cap regulation) as much as anything else." If λ = 0, then the agent shares the principal's utility function and it is optimal for the principal to give the agent no constraints: the principal achieves a first-best payoff by choosing  = 핉 N . For the rest of this proof I suppose that λ ≠ 0. I prove the proposition by first considering an augmented game in which the principal can "cheat" and learn some information about the states before choosing . Conditional on this extra information, the principal does at least as well as in the original problem. So the optimal payoff in the augmented game gives an upper bound on what the principal can achieve in the original game. Then I show that the delegation set  * in the original game exactly implements the optimal outcomes of the augmented game. Because this set achieves a theoretical upper bound on payoffs, it must be optimal.
In the augmented game, before the principal chooses a delegation set , he learns some information about the state. In particular, he observes the projection P θ of θ onto the hyperplane defined by { x ∈ 핉 N | ∑ i λ i x i = 0 } :
So in the augmented game, we add a period 0 to the original description:
0. The state θ is realized, and the principal observes P θ .
The principal chooses a delegation set
2. The agent observes the underlying states, θ.
3. The agent chooses a vector of actions a from  to maximize her payoff V A .
Learning the projection P θ is equivalent to learning on which line parallel to the agent's bias λ is the state θ. Denote the line parallel to λ intersecting P θ by M θ , and parametrize points on the line by the distance k ∈ 핉 from P θ (where λ is taken to be pointing in the positive direction):
The proof that the augmented optimum implements the outcome from  * will come from putting together three observations, each one represented graphically in Figure A1 . Frankel: Delegating Multiple Decisions First, after observing P θ , the principal now believes that the state is normally distributed on the line M θ :
OBSERVATION 1: Conditional on observing P θ , the principal's posterior belief on θ is that θ = M θ (k) for k distributed normally with mean 0 and variance 1.
This result is seen most easily by recalling that by independence, conditional on any known θ −i , the coordinate θ i has a standard normal distribution. By the spherical symmetry of the distribution of θ, these lines parallel to a coordinate axis are not special. The principal's posterior belief on θ conditional on knowing that it is on any line M θ must have a standard normal distribution on that line.
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So once the principal has observed P θ , he now knows that the state has a standard normal distribution on a line (embedded in N dimensions) parallel to the agent's bias vector. If we knew that the optimal delegation set in 핉 N would restrict the agent's actions to this line, then Lemma 1, part 2 would tell us exactly which subset of the line to allow: a ray, capped against the direction of the agent's bias, extending _ k (| λ |) from the mean. But how do we know that the principal cannot do better by getting the agent to take actions which are sometimes off of the line?
This step is a key technical point in the paper. It follows from Lemma 1, part 3, that the optimal one-dimensional delegation set is not improved by randomization. In payoff terms, randomization is exactly equivalent to taking an action off of the line. In a one dimensional problem, a lottery over actions with mean a and variance Figure A1 . The Augmented Game
Notes: Observation 1: In the augmented game, before the principal chooses a delegation set, he observes P θ , the projection of θ onto the hyperplane defined by ∑ i λ i a i = 0. That is, he learns the line M θ parallel to λ on which θ lies. The principal's posterior is that the distance k from P θ to θ has a standard normal distribution. Observation 2: Conditional on the information that θ lies on M θ , the thick black line  aug is an optimal delegation set. s 2 gives the principal and agent their payoffs from a , minus the quadratic loss term s 2 . In the multidimensional problem, where both players' ideal points are on the line M θ , taking an action which is a distance s from the line and projects to a on M θ gives the principal and agent their payoff from action a, minus the quadratic loss term s 2 . So if random allocations cannot improve payoffs in the one-dimensional delegation problem, then points off of the line cannot improve payoffs after embedding the one dimensional delegation problem in multiple dimensions.
OBSERVATION 2: Given the observation of P θ , the set
is an optimal delegation set in the augmented game.
The cutoff value of _ k on this delegation set does not depend on the observation of P θ . This fact follows from the assumption that θ was i.i.d. normally distributed, and in particular that as we translate a line along any perpendicular dimension, the conditional distributions of θ on this line remain constant. So if we take the union of all of the augmented delegation rays over all possible observations of P θ , we have a half-space-indeed, the set  * as defined before. The boundary is a hyperplane normal to the agent's bias. If the agent were given this half-space as a delegation set from the start, she would choose her ideal point if feasible, or else would choose the projection of her ideal point onto the bounding hyperplane. In either case, her chosen action would be on the line M θ . So she would choose the same actions as in the augmented game. 
(ii) For any θ, the agent's optimal choice of a from  * in the original game is equal to her optimal choice of a from  aug ( P θ ) in the augmented game.
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. Giving the agent a delegation set  * with K set to _ k · | λ | implements the same outcomes as giving the optimal delegation sets in the augmented game. And in expectation the principal must do weakly better in the augmented game, in which she has strictly more information than 25 Notice that this proof technique would fail under an alternate distribution of states. The conditional distribution along a line would vary as we translated the line, and therefore the optimal delegation ray cutoffs (corresponding to _ k ) would vary with P θ . So if we took the union of augmented delegation rays, the set would not be a hyperplane normal to the bias. That would mean that the agent's ideal point projected onto the closest point of the boundary would not necessarily be in the same line M θ as the state. Therefore, the union delegation set would implement different outcomes than the augmented delegation sets.
in the original game. So no delegation set in the original game can give a higher expected payoff than does  * . From this argument, we see that the delegation set  * implements the optimal outcomes not just of any deterministic mechanism, but of any stochastic one as well. ∎
B. Additional Proofs
PROOF OF LEMMA 1:
An agent with λ = 0 who is given delegation set  * = 핉 will always take first-best actions, so this delegation set is clearly optimal. So consider an agent with λ > 0 ; the problem with λ < 0 is symmetric. In this case I seek to show the optimality of the delegation set  * = {a | a ≤ _ k } . In order to apply the characterization from Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) (ii) g(θ) < 1 , for all θ .
(iii) There exists a unique value β 1 , such that g( β 1 ) = 0 , with g(θ) > 0 for θ < β 1 and g(θ) < 0 for θ > β 1 . Furthermore, there exists a unique β 0 < β 1 such that
Proofs are below. The first item is the regularity condition labeled Assumption 1 in Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) .
26 It follows from from the fact that the normal distribution has an increasing hazard rate. Given this condition, Proposition 1 of Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) implies that the optimal delegation set is a closed interval from a lower action α 0 (possibly negative infinity, given the unbounded action space) to an upper action β 0 (possibly positive infinity). Following (Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) 26 Their paper also assumes that states are drawn from a compact support, but this is not necessary for the result. We could approximate the normal distribution through a sequence of increasing hazard rate distributions with compact support; index these distributions by n . For any fixed delegation set , the sequence of payoffs V ̃ P n () would approach the payoff under the normal distribution; this is because the normal has finite variance, so the contribution to (quadratic loss) payoffs from states with | θ | > l for any action a ∈ 핉 goes to 0 for l → ∞. Let V ̃ P ∞ ( * ) indicate the payoff from the proposed delegation set under the normal distribution, and thus the limit of V ̃ P (n) () . Now suppose for the sake of contradiction that an alternative delegation set  ′ gives a higher payoff of V ̃ P ∞ (′ ) = V ̃ P ∞ ( * ) + ϵ , with ϵ > 0 . Then, for n large enough,  ′ gives a payoff of V ̃ P n (′ ) > V ̃ P n ( * ) + ϵ/2 . But Kováč and Mylovanov's result formally solves for the sequence of optimal delegation sets for these compact distributions, and shows that these optimal delegation sets approach  * . So for n large enough, V ̃ P n () < V ̃ P n ( * ) + ϵ/2 for all . This is a contradiction.
Therefore the delegation set  = {a | a ≤ β 0 } is optimal, and optimal among stochastic delegation sets as well. I now need only show that the value β 0 derived above is identical to _ k (λ) defined in Lemma 1.
CLAIM 2: β 0 is the unique solution to
This claim completes the proof. ∎ PROOF OF CLAIM 1:
(i) As noted in footnote 10 of Kováč and Mylovanov (2009) , it suffices to show that the normal distribution has an increasing hazard rate. This can be confirmed by recalling that the hazard rate of the standard normal distribution at x is exactly the conditional expectation of a normal distribution truncated below at x :
. The left-hand side is increasing in x , thus so too is the right-hand side.
(ii) Given part 1, that g(θ) is decreasing when g(θ) ∈ [0, 1] , it suffices to confirm that li m θ→−∞ g (θ) . This follows from the definition of g( · ) .
(iii) First I show that there exists β 1 , such that g( β 1 ) = 0 ; if so, part 1 implies that g(θ) > 0 for θ < β 1 and g(θ) < 0 for θ > β 1 . To show this, recalling the identity that ϕ′(θ) = −θϕ(θ) ,
, and therefore g(θ) < 0 for some large θ ∈ 핉 . Because g (θ) > 0 for some small θ ∈ 핉 , by continuity there exists an intersection of g(θ) with 0.
To show the result about β 0 , we observe that the function ∫ X β 1 g (θ) dθ becomes arbitrarily large as X goes to minus infinity (because li m θ→−∞ g(θ) = 1); it decreases in X for X < β 1 ; and it goes to 0 as X goes to β 1 . So there is a unique solution β 0 on the left-hand side, with β 0 < β 1 , so long as the righthand side is finite. Integrating by parts:
β 0 is the unique point satisfying
dθ , and because g (θ) is continuous and has a single crossing with 0, it is also the unique point satisfying
Recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that _ k (| λ |) could be derived as the value defined as β 0 in Claim 1. So for a bias magnitude λ > 0, it holds that
Taking derivative of both sides with respect to x , The principal's payoff is minus the expectation of this quantity squared, Define the delegation set 
. I will construct a strategy which is feasible in  -(K ) and gives payoffs per decision going to first-best levels; this will provide a lower bound on the principal's payoffs from the agent's optimal strategy in (K ) :
(i) The principal's expected payoffs from the agent-optimal strategy under delegation set  -(K) (in a simultaneous or sequential problem) is a lower bound on the principal's payoffs from the optimal strategy given (K) . This is because the strategy for  -(K) is feasible in  (K) and therefore gives the agent weakly
exactly K , whereas K is an upper bound in the strategy for (K) -and so the expectation of V P = ∑ i u Pi ( a i | θ i ) is weakly higher in the strategy for (K)
(ii) Take an arbitrary agent strategy that is feasible in  -(K) . The principal's payoffs from this strategy give a lower bound on the principal's payoffs from the agent's optimal strategy in  -(K), because conditional on the restriction that ∑ i G i ( a i ) = K the principal and agent have fully aligned preferences over actions-the set  -(K) satisfies the property of "aligned delegation." The optimal agent choice is optimal for the principal as well.
(iii) I will now construct a strategy which can be played for delegation set  -(K )
in a sequential or a simultaneous problem; the action on decision i depends only on information available from decisions 1 through i . Say an action a i at
The strategy is as follows: At decision i , play a i * ( θ i ) if this action is sequential-feasible, and otherwise play an arbitrary sequential-feasible action.
I seek to show that under delegation sets with budgets K (N ) , this strategy yields non-first-best actions for a number of decisions on the order of N Plugging in for K , the strategy yields first-best decisions on decision i in the N th problem if
It suffices to show that the probability that this holds goes to 1 as we increase N and consider i at i (N) 
+ϵ for some fixed ϵ > 0 :
• Show probability of ∑ j=1
Divide both sides by the standard deviation of the left-hand side,
σ j 2 . We are looking for the probability that
The left-hand side has mean 0 and standard deviation 1.
The numerator on the right-hand side contains approximately N For N large enough the fraction becomes arbitrarily highly positive, and so the right-hand side becomes arbitrarily negative. By Chebyshev's inequality, the probability that the left-hand side is greater than the right-hand side goes to 1.
• Show probability of ∑ j=1 i (N) ( G j ( θ j ) − μ j ) < ∑ j= i (N) +1 N ( μ j − G _ j ( θ j )) goes to 1: Identical argument as above, where the right-hand side now becomes arbitrarily large. Chebyshev again implies the result.
We see from the proof that the assumptions were unnecessarily strict for the simultaneous problem. Even retaining a "greedy" strategy which picks as many first-best actions as possible, we might be able to get more first-best actions in the simultaneous problem if we pick actions in an order which depends on utilities and state realizations rather than in order of their decision number. ∎ (ii) Prior to the realization of θ i , the principal's expected payoff from actions i through N is
By the sequential version of Lemma 2, the agent acts to maximize the principal's payoff. Given that, I prove (i) and (ii) by backwards induction: Base case-show (i) and (ii) for i = N : At period N , the agent must choose a i = K i / λ i and this gives the principal a payoff of
Plugging in, we can see that this confirms the inductive hypotheses (i) and (ii).
Inductive case-show (i) and (ii) for i , supposing they hold for periods i + 1 and beyond:
By inductive hypothesis (ii), the principal's payoff (which the agent maximizes) for periods i through N , given K i and θ i , is
Taking the first-order condition of this payoff with respect to a i confirms (i) for period i . Plugging this optimal action back into the payoff and taking expectation over θ i confirms (ii).
Plugging in K 1 = ∑ j=1 N λ j E [ θ j ] into (ii) at i = 1 establishes the payoff result for 
MH
. We can also confirm that this is the value of K which maximizes the principal's payoff. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6:
The finitely many states with biases outside of the bounds can be ignored, since the variances are still finite; think of the agent as committing to take action equal to the expected state for each of these decisions (incurring an absolute payoff loss equal to minus the variance, and thus not affecting payoffs per decision for large N ), and then choosing other actions optimally. This suboptimal commitment gives lower payoffs to the agent and to the principal than playing exactly optimally.
Suppose now, without loss, that all bias magnitudes are uniformly bounded between the two positive numbers α _ < _ α and the variance of each θ i is below v > 0 . 
(a) + H(θ).
A cap now corresponds to a delegation set of the form (K ) = { a | G(a) ≤ K } for some K ∈ 핉 . Once again, these caps align incentives in the sense of Lemma 2. First, if the agent were restricted to choose from the boundary of any such set  (K ) , her choice would maximize the principal's payoff. Second, allowing her to choose inside the boundary only improves the principal's payoff. In the monopoly pricing and the tariff examples of Section IIIB, we previously had  = Θ = 핉 N where preferences over a i (prices, or profit net of tariffs, in a given market) depended only on θ i (the cost, or political, parameter for that market). Suppose we now allow for cross-elasticities of demand across markets. Preferences over action a i may now depend not only on θ i but also a j≠i and θ j≠i -the pricing of good i depends on the price and cost of good j . Regardless of the nature of these cross-elasticities, we can put the problems into the functional form above. For the monopolist, profit V A is equal to total surplus V P minus the consumer surplus, so a cap corresponds to a floor on consumer surplus. For the country imposing a tariff, domestic surplus V A is equal to total surplus V P minus the foreign profits, so cap corresponds to a floor on foreign profits. The fact that the markets may interact with one another does not fundamentally change the nature of the cap.
In other settings, we need not take  = Θ , or even require that the two spaces be of the same dimensionality. The shape of a monopolist's cost curve on each good might be determined by the realizations of many different states, for instance. Moreover, one state variable could affect costs of multiple goods at once.
